By joshua 
SUPREME COURT AS THE FINAL ARBITER: WHY ADC’S REFORM PROCESS UNDER DAVID MARK DESERVES LEGAL VALIDATION
By Christopher Sunday
I am not a lawyer. What follows is not a legal opinion in the strict technical sense, but a reflection shaped by philosophical reasoning and an attempt to interpret unfolding political realities. My position is therefore speculative, not definitive, and certainly not cast in stone. It is an effort to channel a narrative that situates law within the broader context of institutional behavior, democratic necessity, and practical governance.
In every constitutional democracy, moments of internal party conflict test not just political actors, but the strength of institutions that regulate democratic order. The ongoing dispute within the African Democratic Congress ADC over leadership restructuring and the conduct of state congresses has now reached a decisive threshold. With a pending determination before the Supreme Court of Nigeria, the matter transcends intra party disagreement and enters the domain of constitutional clarity, institutional coherence, and democratic stability.
At the heart of the dispute lies a fundamental question. Can a political party, acting in coordination with the Independent National Electoral Commission, undertake a process of internal reform through a caretaker structure without violating its constitution. The answer must be approached not with narrow legal formalism alone, but with a balanced appreciation of law, institutional practice, and democratic necessity.
The Federal High Court ruling that restrained INEC from recognizing congresses conducted by committees appointed by the caretaker leadership has been presented by some as a definitive closure. However, this interpretation is premature. In Nigeria’s judicial hierarchy, the Supreme Court is the final authority, and its impending pronouncement will provide the binding interpretation that all actors must follow. Until then, the matter remains open, dynamic, and subject to higher constitutional reasoning.
It is important to recognize that the reform process led by the David Mark faction did not occur in secrecy or in defiance of regulatory oversight. On the contrary, INEC was actively involved in the leadership regularization process. The Commission not only monitored proceedings but also reportedly swore affidavits affirming its participation. This is not a trivial detail. It demonstrates that the process was conducted within an institutional framework that aligns with Nigeria’s electoral governance system.
Critics argue that INEC’s involvement does not override the party’s constitution. That is correct in principle. However, constitutional interpretation is not carried out in isolation from institutional realities. Where a national electoral body participates in, monitors, and acknowledges a process, it introduces a layer of legitimacy that cannot be casually dismissed. The law must not operate in a vacuum detached from the structures that give it practical meaning.
At this point, it becomes necessary to situate the matter within established judicial precedent. The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has been remarkably consistent on the issue of non interference in internal party affairs. In Onuoha v. Okafor, the apex court held that the choice of candidates by political parties is a political question over which the courts have no jurisdiction. The court made it clear that there is no judicially manageable standard by which such decisions can be assessed, thereby placing them firmly within the domain of party autonomy.
This position was reinforced in Musa v. PRP, where the court emphasized that political parties, being voluntary associations, are entitled to regulate their internal affairs without undue judicial interference. Even where such decisions appear unreasonable, the courts have historically exercised restraint.
More recently, in Uba v. Ozigbo, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the nomination of candidates remains the exclusive preserve of political parties, and that courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of party structures. Similarly, in Anyanwu v. Emmanuel and Anyanwu v. Aniagwu, the court reiterated that disputes relating to party leadership and internal organization are largely non justiciable, falling outside the jurisdiction of the courts.
Taken together, these authorities establish a clear doctrine. Political parties, as voluntary organizations, possess primary authority over their internal governance, and courts should be slow to intervene except in cases of clear statutory or constitutional violation.
Within this doctrinal framework, the caretaker leadership under the influence of David Mark must be understood as part of an internal reform mechanism. Political parties are not static institutions. They evolve in response to crises, inefficiencies, and the need for renewal. Where existing structures become contested or dysfunctional, interim arrangements such as caretaker committees often emerge as pragmatic tools for stabilization and reorganization.
To invalidate such a process without adequate consideration of both judicial precedent and institutional context would risk creating a troubling contradiction. On one hand, the courts assert non interference in party affairs. On the other, they intervene in a process aimed at internal restructuring under regulatory observation. Such inconsistency could undermine both legal certainty and political stability.
Furthermore, the implications of sustaining the Federal High Court ruling without modification are far reaching. It would effectively decentralize party authority in a manner that risks fragmenting national cohesion within the ADC. In a political environment already shaped by identity based divisions, such fragmentation could weaken the party’s ability to function as a unified national platform.
The Supreme Court is therefore presented with an opportunity to reaffirm its long standing doctrine while adapting it to contemporary realities. It must determine not only whether the caretaker committee strictly complied with the party constitution, but also whether the broader reform process aligns with principles of democratic governance, institutional cooperation, and political stability.
A decision that recognizes the validity of the reform process while possibly clarifying the limits of caretaker authority would strike a necessary balance between legality and practicality. It would affirm that political parties can undertake structured internal reforms under institutional supervision without being undermined by rigid procedural constraints.
Ultimately, this is not merely a contest between factions. It is a test of how the Nigerian legal system interprets the intersection of law, politics, and institutional practice. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Nigeria will either reinforce a rigid formalism that risks destabilizing party systems, or articulate a more pragmatic jurisprudence that recognizes the realities of political organization in a complex democracy.
In the final analysis, the reform pathway pursued by the David Mark faction, anchored in institutional engagement with INEC and supported by established judicial principles of party autonomy, deserves careful and favorable consideration. The Supreme Court now holds the responsibility to provide clarity, restore confidence, and strengthen both internal party democracy and Nigeria’s broader electoral system.
The nation awaits its verdict.