By joshua 
Why Senator Natasha Akpoti May Not Return To The Senate: Section 66 of Constitution
The legal and constitutional implications of Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan’s recent conviction for defamation and other pending legal matters raise important questions about her continued eligibility to occupy a seat in the Nigerian Senate.
While Section 66(1)(c) lays the foundation for disqualification, Sections 68(1)(b) and 68(2) outline the procedure and powers through which the Senate can enforce or give effect to such disqualification.
Relevant Constitutional Provisions
Section 66(1)(c) – Ground for Disqualification
“No person shall be qualified for election to the Senate or the House of Representatives if:
(c) he has been convicted and sentenced for an offence involving dishonesty or fraud, or any other offence punishable by imprisonment of more than one year… unless he has been granted a pardon.”
This provision establishes that conviction and sentencing for an offence involving dishonesty, fraud, or other serious crimes disqualifies a person from election or continued membership of the National Assembly.
Section 68(1)(b) – Vacancy Arising from Disqualification
“A member of the Senate or of the House of Representatives shall vacate his seat in the House of which he is a member if:
(b) any other circumstances arise that, if he were not a member of the Senate or the House of Representatives, would cause him to be disqualified for election as a member…”
This means that if a serving senator becomes disqualified under Section 66 after being elected (e.g., via a criminal conviction), their seat becomes vacant by operation of law.
Section 68(2) – Senate’s Power to Determine Vacancy
“The President of the Senate or, as the case may be, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall give effect to the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, so however that he is satisfied that the provisions of that subsection have become applicable in respect of any member.”
This vests the Senate President with the authority to declare the seat vacant—but only if satisfied that the constitutional conditions for disqualification have indeed occurred. This often requires:
A final conviction by a competent court;
Evidence that the sentence exceeds one year and the offence involves dishonesty, fraud, or other moral failings;
No presidential or gubernatorial pardon has been granted.
Implications for Senator Natasha
1. Defamation Conviction:
If the defamation conviction is criminal in nature and results in a sentence exceeding one year, and if it is shown to involve dishonesty or intent to deceive, then Section 66(1)(c) could apply.
The Senate President, under Section 68(2), may then be called upon to declare the seat vacant.
2. Contempt and Other Charges:
If any pending case leads to a criminal conviction and sentencing, and the nature of the offence fits Section 66(1)(c), disqualification follows.
The triggering of Section 68(1)(b) makes her continued tenure in the Senate unconstitutional.
3. Appeal Process:
If the conviction is under appeal, the disqualification may not take full effect yet, as courts generally allow for exhaustion of appellate rights before enforcing disqualification.
However, if the Senate President is satisfied that the conviction has reached finality or is enforceable (e.g., no stay of execution), he can act under Section 68(2).
Conclusion: Legal Pathway to Disqualification
The combination of Sections 66(1)(c), 68(1)(b), and 68(2) presents a clear constitutional mechanism for disqualifying a sitting senator once the grounds are met. In Senator Natasha’s case:
If her defamation conviction or any other legal outcome meets the threshold of Section 66(1)(c),
And if no pardon is issued or appeal fails,
The Senate President has constitutional authority under Section 68(2) to declare her seat vacant.
Until then, the presumption of innocence and the right to appeal protect her tenure—but the constitutional risks remain real and could be decisive if the legal outcomes firm up.